O ver the past 50 years, scholars have published nearly 1,000 research articles in political science and public administration journals about "policy diff usion." Th is interest in how policies spread from one government to the next has been increasing among scholars and practitioners alike. Yet, although this focus has produced numerous insights into the policy-making process, the sheer volume of scholarship makes it diffi cult to identify and understand the key fi ndings and lessons. Indeed, it is hard to see the forest through all of these trees. 1 In this article, we step back and draw seven lessons from the literature and its current direction. Our review has three main purposes: First, this article may serve as an introduction for readers who are largely unfamiliar with policy diff usion. Second, practitioners may better understand diff usion pressures and their impacts on policy choices by focusing on key lessons. And fi nally, scholars who are interested in policy adoption, innovation, and diff usion may fi nd new research directions in the takeaway points off ered here. Th us, our goal is to provide insights to both practitioners and scholars, knowing that this necessarily entails sacrifi cing some depth and specifi city in order to capture broad lessons of general interest.
In its most generic form, policy diff usion is defi ned as one government's policy choices being infl uenced by the choices of other governments. With this defi nition in hand, the importance of policy diff usion is undeniable. Th ose who wish to understand why governments adopt particular policies would be hard-pressed to fi nd examples of policies that are selected entirely for internal reasons. Policy makers rely on examples and insights from those who have experimented with policies in the past. Government offi cials worry about the impact that the policies of others will have on their own jurisdictions. Th e world is connected today as never before, and those connections structure the policy opportunities and constraints faced by policy makers at the local, regional, state, national, and international levels.
In the American context, for example, health policy cannot be understood without assessing both the eff ects of state experiments on the formulation of national policies and the subsequent eff ects of those national policies on the states.
2 Welfare reforms off er opportunities to learn from other governments' earlier policies while trying to avoid becoming attractive to a needy population. Local and state governments compete for businesses with various tax incentives. Th e centralization of education policy in recent decades, with more funding provided and regulatory controls exerted by state and national governments, has dramatically altered local choices by superintendents and school boards. And the U.S. experience is not unique. External factors infl uence internal policy choices in every major policy area around the world. As just one example, pressure on European Union countries facing debt crises to adopt austerity measures by other member governments illustrates how policy diff usion considerations do not stop at national borders.
In today's interconnected world, understanding policy diff usion is crucial to understanding policy advocacy and policy change more broadly. For instance, given that state governments may learn from local antismoking experiences, is an antismoking group better served by targeting its limited resources toward advocating change at the local level or at the state level (see, e.g., Shipan and Volden 2006) ? And, given numerous policy diff usion pressures, can scholars be confi dent in their explanations of policy choices without adequately accounting for external infl uences Policy Diff usion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and Practitioners 2011), and the rate at which innovations spread has accelerated (Boushey 2010) . Whereas prior policy makers may have been limited to learning only from the experiences of nearby neighbors, today's sophisticated politicians and administrators have a much greater capacity to look far and wide for useful solutions to policy problems. Although these changes make detecting policy diff usion more diffi cult than merely exploring geographic clusters, they off er amazing opportunities for better policy choice and make the fi eld of policy diff usion studies more interesting and signifi cant than ever before.
Lesson 2: Governments Compete with One Another
Responding to claims that governments cannot be as effi cient or innovative as the free market, Charles Tiebout (1956) presented a model in which local governments compete with one another, off ering policies that are attractive to residents who sort themselves into jurisdictions based on their preferences for taxes and spending. Th is work launched a massive scholarly research stream of its own and drew attention to the idea of competition across governments.
In terms of policy diff usion, such competition aff ects the choices of other governments. A city that fi nds its middle-class residents moving to the suburbs for better schools may need to respond with education reforms of its own, or instead it may cater to other possible residents by focusing on altogether diff erent alternatives, such as attracting a professional sports team or improving public transportation. Th is example illustrates the breadth of the concept of policy diff usion. Not merely the study of whether the same policies spread across governments, policy diff usion broadly encompasses the interrelated decisions of governments, even when one government's education policies infl uence another's transportation or entertainment policies.
While much of the economics literature that followed Tiebout focused on the wasteful nature of tax competition across states and localities (e.g., Wilson 1999) , literatures in political science, public administration, and sociology turned to examples of public spending, regulation, and the production of public and private goods. For example, Berry and Berry (1990) demonstrate competition across state borders as one key determinant of state lottery adoption. Such competition is not merely reactive to the decisions of other states, but also can be strategic, anticipatory, and preemptive (e.g., Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011) .
It is in the realm of "redistributive" policies that competition-based policy diff usion has generated some of the most heated policy exchanges. Here, scholars and practitioners have focused on the possibility of a "race to the bottom" in social programs such as welfare. As articulated by Peterson and Rom (1990) in the American context, state policy makers worry about becoming "welfare magnets," to which potential recipients move in order to receive higher benefi ts. Such fears may lead state governments to undercut one another in their redistributive services, eventually racing toward undesirable social safety nets. Th e race-to-the-bottom concept fueled major policy discussions about the likely impacts of welfare (see, e.g., Berry 1994) ? Th e following lessons begin to answer the numerous questions that arise once scholars and practitioners turn their focus to policy diff usion.
Lesson 1: Policy Diffusion Is Not (Merely) the Geographic Clustering of Similar Policies
Th e spread of a policy innovation from one government to the next tends to bring to mind spatial imagery, such as ripples spreading from a pebble dropped in a pond. Indeed, early work on policy diffusion emphasized this sort of eff ect, usually conceived of as regional clustering (e.g., Walker 1969) . Th is classic view of policy diff usion continued into recent decades. Even when the methodological sophistication of event history analysis began to allow external and internal determinants of policy choices to be examined simultaneously (Berry and Berry 1990) , diff usion forces were often measured merely by the number of geographically neighboring states that had already adopted the given policy. Presumably, if scholars control for the internal reasons for a policy adoption and fi nd evidence that earlier choices of neighbors still matter, then policy diff usion is relevant to understanding such adoptions.
While off ering a good starting point, the classic view of policy diffusion as geographic clustering is often overly limiting, sometimes misleading (or even wrong), and increasingly outdated. Th is view is overly limiting because there are many reasons why policy makers look beyond their own jurisdictions in making policy choices. Lessons about how to deal with budget defi cits in California need not be drawn only from Oregon, Nevada, and Arizona. Detroit is not competing for business only with Cleveland and Ann Arbor, but also with Toronto, Shanghai, and Seoul. And, as countries wrestle with how to downsize their social programs, their quest for answers does not stop at nearby borders, but instead extends to larger regions or even worldwide (e.g., Brooks 2005; Weyland 2007 ).
Moreover, even when geographic clustering may be theoretically important, appearances of such clustering may be misleading. Similar governments often face the same types of problems and opportunities at about the same times. Which states were likely to reinstate the death penalty after the U.S. Supreme Court rulings of the 1970s (Mooney and Lee 1999) ? Which governments around the world would adopt e-government and e-democracy practices when the relevant technologies became available (Lee, Chang, and Berry 2011) ? How would states develop and modify enterprise zones given federal incentives (Mossberger 2000) ? Because similar states tend to adopt similar policies, and because geographically neighboring states tend to have many political, economic, and demographic similarities, evidence of geographic policy clustering may have little to do with policy diff usion-that is, with one government's policy choices depending on others' policies (Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008) .
In today's world, with low barriers to communication and travel, the classic view of policy diff usion as geographic clustering is growing increasingly outdated. Over time, the lists of the most innovative American states have changed (Boehmke and Skinner While off ering a good starting point, the classic view of policy diff usion as geographic clustering is often overly limiting, sometimes misleading (or even wrong), and increasingly outdated.
Given the political nature of policy choices, the multifaceted goals of policy makers, and the complexity of policies themselves, learning-based policy diff usion may be limited in a variety of ways. Weyland (2007) , for example, demonstrates how national policy makers throughout Latin America were infl uenced by a series of biases and heuristics in developing their pension reform processes rather than making rational assessments based on all available information. Moynihan (2008) shows how policy makers rely on their networks to learn under uncertainty and during times of crisis. Learning about others' policies and then eff ectively using lessons learned to solve one's own policy problems is time intensive and takes a high degree of skill. Time-pressed policy makers, those with limited staff support, and those generalists who have not had the opportunity to gain specialized expertise will not be able to take full advantage of others' policy experiences.
Limits on the capacity to learn from others can be overcome, at least partially, by technological advances and by go-between actors. Low-cost communication and travel allow today's policy makers to attend conferences to exchange ideas, to venture forth on fact-fi nding trips, and to exchange information widely while sitting at their own desks. Interstate professional organizations such as the National Conference of State Legislatures or the National Governors Association off er clearinghouses of information about the policies adopted by other governments (e.g., Balla 2001) . Similar organizations exist at other levels of government and around the world. Füglister (2012) , for example, shows that membership in intergovernmental health policy conferences in Switzerland increases the likelihood that a canton will learn about and then adopt successful policies found in other cantons. Informal personal networks also help with the search for appropriate policies (e.g., Binz-Scharf, Lazer, and Mergel 2012). Additionally, policy advocates and entrepreneurs can step in to inform policy makers about policies that they believe would be attractive and eff ective in a new jurisdiction (e.g., Haas 1992; Mintrom 1997) . However, although these groups and individuals may help overcome limits to learning, they also bring with them their own biases and limitations.
Lesson 4: Policy Diffusion Is Not Always Benefi cial
Competition across governments may help remove ineffi ciencies, eliminate waste, match services to residents' desires, or hold down taxes, mimicking market incentives. Learning among governments can produce experimentation and more eff ective policy choices. Yet competition may also produce a race to the bottom in certain redistributive programs, and the wrong lessons can often be drawn from others' experiences (e.g., Sharman 2010; Soule 1999). 3 Th erefore, while it is important to recognize the favorable aspects of policy diff usion, it would be wrong to declare interrelated policy decisions across governments always benefi cial.
Scholars have identifi ed four main mechanisms of policy diff usion: competition and learning, as discussed earlier, but also imitation and coercion (e.g., Shipan and Volden 2008) . Imitation is the copying of another government's policies without concern for those policies' eff ects; thus, the extent of learning in these circumstances devolution in the mid-1990s and generated sizable scholarly literatures about why and where poor people move (e.g., Bailey 2005) and about the incentives of state policy makers (e.g., Volden 1997).
Although competition across states, localities, and countries exists in a wide range of policy areas, from taxes to welfare to trade, its importance for policy choices should not be overstated. For instance, the evidence that potential welfare recipients move across state lines for greater welfare benefi ts is mixed at best. For many other policy areas, ranging from county foster care policies, to state regulations on youth access to tobacco, to national disease control policies, governments have little or nothing to gain from competition. In many cases, governments set aside competition altogether, solving their problems collectively through interstate compacts or multilateral trade agreements. And more pernicious forms of competition across states have been explicitly disallowed; for example, the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution keeps states from engaging in their own trade wars against one another.
Lesson 3: Governments Learn from Each Other
In his famous dissenting opinion in the case New State Ice Co. v Liebmann, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis wrote, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country" (285 U.S. 262 [1932] , 311). In order for governments to fully serve their roles as laboratories of democracy, policy makers must act as scientists, watching these experiments and learning from them. Indeed, the policy diff usion literature has recently provided substantial evidence of governments learning from one another's experiences. Meseguer (2006) , for example, fi nds that countries learn from the eff ectiveness of others' trade liberalization policies and structure their own policies as a result. Volden (2006) shows that the American states that were best able to reduce their uninsured rates among poor children were most likely to have their children's health insurance programs copied by other states. Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet (2009) establish that countries are more likely to change their hospital fi nancing policies when they are ineff ective and that these governments tend to adopt policies found to be eff ective elsewhere.
Such learning takes us far afi eld from the geographic clustering of policies. Th e best and most relevant experiments may be across the country or halfway around the world. Moreover, what is learned may have more to do with political opportunity than with policy eff ectiveness. Policies are complex, and the goals of policy makers vary from one government to the next. Success in containing costs may be more attractive to some than success in improving health outcomes, for example. Electorally minded politicians may care about the political success achieved rather than the policy success (Gilardi 2010) , may look for political cover when adopting unpopular policies such as tax increases (Berry and Berry 1992) , or may seek to learn not only about better policies but also about how better to compete with other governments (Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002) .
While it is important to recognize the favorable aspects of policy diff usion, it would be wrong to declare interrelated policy decisions across governments always benefi cial.
policies might have on statewide antismoking policies. On one hand, there could be a "snowball eff ect," whereby the momentum from the adoption of more local antismoking restrictions leads to a greater likelihood of state adoption. On the other hand, there could be a "pressure valve eff ect," whereby the adoption of antismoking restrictions in all of the localities that really want them takes pressure off the state government to act.
Given that both of these eff ects seem plausible, we set out to learn which eff ect occurs and, if both do, which political features within a state might produce one eff ect instead of the other. We found that both of these eff ects do indeed take place, but which eff ect predominated was determined by interest group politics and by the capacity of the state legislature. For example, in states with an active and strong health lobby in the state legislature, local adoptions positively infl uenced the likelihood of state adoptions, as these lobbyists could point to favorable local experiences. States without strong health lobbyists were not only less likely to adopt antismoking restrictions overall, but even less likely still to do so if localities had already adopted a number of restrictions.
In terms of capacity, about a dozen states do not pay their legislators any annual salary at all, beyond covering per diem expenses; some legislatures do not meet for more than a few months every year or two; and many do not hire extensive legislative staff s. Such circumstances profoundly infl uence policy diff usion processes. Because of their lower capacity, these "less professional" state legislatures exhibit a strong pressure valve eff ect. If the localities adopted antismoking restrictions, that action removed the problem from the state policy agenda. Legislators could move on to more pressing business or return home to their primary jobs. In contrast, the most professional (and higher-capacity) states exhibited the strongest snowball eff ect, with state legislators clamoring to take local policies, extend them statewide, and use their policy achievements as grounds to advance their political careers.
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In a follow-up study (Shipan and Volden 2008) , we assessed which diff usion mechanisms led localities to adopt these antismoking restrictions in the fi rst place and discover that policy-making capacity once again had a signifi cant impact. Larger cities learned greatly from earlier localities' experiences and resisted preemptive pressures from their state government. In contrast, policy makers in smaller communities were less likely to learn and more likely to be buff eted by state policy-making decisions. Such small towns were also more susceptible to competition, fearful of losing diners to nearby neighbors if they adopted restaurant restrictions, and they were more likely to imitate the policies of larger cities, even those policies were inappropriate for their own communities.
Th ese two studies refl ect a larger literature on the conditional nature of policy diff usion. Th e particular networks in which governments are embedded infl uence their opportunities for learning. Recent experiences and present policies aff ect policy diff usion. Stone (1999) , for example, argues that governments facing an economic crisis or experiencing a recent military defeat are more susceptible to coercion. Bailey and Rom (2004) show that initially generous governments are more responsive to is merely the acknowledgment that a government that is perceived to be a leader has the policy and that it must, therefore, be something desirable. Imitation may be thought of as the policy diff usion equivalent of "keeping up with the Joneses," with of all the associated negative aspects of such an approach. Th e voting public may demand the adoption of policies that they have seen or experienced elsewhere, regardless of whether those policies are ultimately suitable in their home community (e.g., Pacheco 2012) . Cities where professional sports teams would not thrive seek them out nonetheless. State legislatures exactly copy bills written in other states, typos and all. Countries without the proper economic and educational foundations overbuild their infrastructure and industrial parks in the hope that doing so will attract businesses. Sometimes this spread of untested ideas works, but often, it results in inappropriate and understudied policy choices.
Coercion is the use of force, threats, or incentives by one government to aff ect the policy decisions of another. An extreme example is armed confl ict, a concern that has generated its own sizable diff usion literature (e.g., Most and Starr 1980) . But coercion need not rely on the threat of military confl ict. Instead, economic power can provide the foundation for coercion, as seen in the recent attempt by Germany to bring about austerity measures in Greece. Th e example of International Monetary Fund incentives leading developing countries to adopt certain liberalization practices shows how international organizations can be used to facilitate policy diff usion. Coercion can also be seen in a top-down version of policy diff usion, such as when the U.S. federal government attaches restrictions to intergovernmental grants (e.g., Welch and Th ompson 1980). 4 As with other coercive activities, the use of grant incentives to infl uence policies at lower levels of government can be either benefi cial or harmful. Given the intergovernmental competition (noted earlier) that could result from the underprovision of redistributive policies, the U.S. government has long used matching grants for programs such as welfare or Medicaid, encouraging a greater level of state funding by substantially increasing the bang from a state's buck. More direct vertical policy coercion comes in the form of unfunded mandates of states and localities or preemptive clauses restricting the policy discretion of states or localities. As an example of how localities prefer their own policy choices over statewide choices, Conlisk et al. (1995) note the case of North Carolina, which adopted statewide smoking restrictions in 1993 that would preempt any local laws passed after the following October 15. In the three months before the preemption took eff ect, the number of local antismoking restrictions soared from 16 to 105, indicating a strong preference for local control over state preemption. In sum, the policy diff usion concept captures the interrelated policy decisions across governments, whether they are based favorably on the normatively appealing concepts of cooperation and learning or less favorably on the manipulation of incentives.
Lesson 5: Politics and Government Capabilities Are Important to Diffusion
In earlier work (Shipan and Volden 2006) , we explored an instance of bottom-up policy diff usion, asking what eff ect local antismoking Th e particular networks in which governments are embedded infl uence their opportunities for learning. most complex policies, for which one state's experiences may not translate well to other states. And there was no learning-based policy diff usion whatsoever observed among the set of policies that could be easily tried and abandoned, presumably because the internal trials served as a substitute for learning from the experiences of others.
Th ese fi ndings complement earlier results in the policy diff usion literature that demonstrate the role of innovation attributes in diff usion processes beyond the policy realm (Rogers 2003) . Other ways of separating one policy from another, however, have produced mixed fi ndings. For example, Mooney and Lee (1995, 1999) fi nd that both morality policies and economic policies diff use in similar ways, albeit for diff erent reasons. Nicholson-Crotty (2009) shows that the salience of a policy increases its rate of diff usion. And Boushey (2010) explores how some policy adoptions occur as " outbreaks," where they are adopted so quickly across governments as to draw into question whether any diff usion processes were involved in their adoption at all.
Just as the political environment and policy maker capacity help determine how and why policies diff use, so, too, does the policy context and the nature of the policies themselves. Scholars and practitioners should not expect the same degree of competition surrounding policies limiting youth access to tobacco as over welfare policies, the same amount of learning about trash collection as about education reforms, or the same types of coercion over crime policies as for economic and trade policies. Th e lessons off ered here, therefore, must be seen in light of political circumstances and policy contexts.
Lesson 7: Decentralization Is Crucial for Policy Diffusion
Th roughout the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. federal government took steps to devolve control over some policy areas, such as welfare, to the state and local levels. More recently, such trends have reversed, with greater centralization in areas such as education and health care. Beyond the American experience, other federal systems have similarly been reassessing which levels of government should control which policy areas. Centralization has also played a major role on the international stage, such as through the creation and expansion of the European Union.
Some of the benefi ts of centralization include economies of scale and reduced redundancy in maintaining policy infrastructures, limits on harmful competitive practices across governments, and proper restrictions on negative spillovers (e.g., limiting harmful environmental pollutants that otherwise would be foisted on neighboring jurisdictions). Some of the costs of centralization include the loss of horizontal competition (along with its effi ciency gains), reduced policy experimentation and learning, and a decreased ability to use local knowledge to match policies to heterogeneous local preferences. Most of these considerations involve key aspects of policy diff usion.
Building on the work of Oates (1968) and Musgrave (1969) , Peterson (1995) argues that state and local governments are best able to handle "developmental" policies, such as education, in which local preferences vary and experimentation and learning are competitive pressures in their redistributive policies than those that already have low benefi t levels.
Th ese conditional factors and the mechanisms of diff usion may themselves change throughout the diff usion process (e.g., Kwon, Berry, and Feiock 2009) . Competition matters more among early policy adopters (Mooney 2001) , whereas coercion is a more potent factor among late adopters (Welch and Th ompson 1980) . And the eff ect of learning increases over time, as more evidence becomes available (Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet 2009) . Because late policy adopters tend to be poorer, smaller, and less cosmopolitan than early adopters (e.g., Crain 1966; Walker 1969) , their political circumstances and policy-making capacities may well infl uence whether they take advantage of their learning opportunities, give in to coercion, or make no policy change at all. Finally, within any given government, diff usion mechanisms take on greater or diminished importance at diff erent stages of the policy formation process, interacting with electoral and political constraints as a policy moves from the agenda-setting stage, to information gathering, to customization (Karch 2007 ).
Lesson 6: Policy Diffusion Depends on the Policies Themselves
Th e foregoing examples note a wide variety of policies that have spread from one government to another. Yet each policy is diff erent, often in a variety of ways. For example, in criminal justice policy making, some policy changes, such as developing new RICO (Racketeer Infl uenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) standards to prosecute organized crime, are quite complex; others are straightforward, such as lowering the drunk driving standard from 0.10 to 0.08 percent blood alcohol content. Some changes, such as extending laws on theft to include credit card theft, are easily compatible with prior practices; others, such as "three strikes" laws, represent substantial breaks from the past. Do diff erences across the complexity or compatibility of laws aff ect the nature of policy diff usion?
To answer this question, Makse and Volden (2011) study the diff usion of 27 diff erent criminal justice laws across the American states over a 30-year period. Th ey rely on expert surveys to rate each policy on fi ve dimensions: complexity and compatibility (as in the foregoing examples), as well as observability (whether the eff ects could be easily seen by others), relative advantage (whether the policy is perceived to have signifi cant advantages over past policy), and trialability (whether the policy could be experimented with in a limited manner). Th e authors fi nd that all fi ve factors matter in explaining the spread of these policies. Complex policies spread more slowly, whereas compatible policies spread more quickly. Additionally, observability, relative advantage, and trialability all enhanced the rate of adoption and diff usion.
Perhaps more intriguingly, the nature of how these policies spread across the states was aff ected by the characteristics of the policies. For example, compared to policies whose eff ects were highly observable, those with low observability were half as likely to exhibit learningbased diff usion. Similarly, learning eff ects were cut in half for the Just as the political environment and policy maker capacity help determine how and why policies diff use, so, too, does the policy context and the nature of the policies themselves.
control over complex and evolving policies that may be best solved over time through experimentation and learning. Th ey should also be reluctant to decentralize policy decisions that may create negative competition, ill-considered policy imitation, or undue coercion. Especially at risk in such devolution decisions are those governments with the least capacity to learn from others and the greatest susceptibility to competition and coercion, such as smaller towns or poorer states and countries.
The Future of Policy Diffusion
Policy diff usion is not just a term to describe the geographic clustering of policies. Rather, it encompasses a broad array of interdependent policy choices across governments. Th e mechanisms of policy diff usion include competition across governments, learning from policy experiments, imitation, and coercion. Th erefore, diff usion can be quite benefi cial or ultimately harmful. How external diff usion pressures aff ect policy choices depends on the capacity of policy makers, political circumstances surrounding policy change, and the characteristics of the policies themselves. Such considerations are important not only for the selection of policies directly but also for the procedural choices regarding whether policies are formulated at the local, regional, national, or international levels.
Th ese complexities all point to major challenges and opportunities for public administration scholars and practitioners. In understanding policy choices, scholars should be attuned to the relevant mechanisms of policy diff usion. Th ey should consider the attributes of the policies that they are studying-whether the policies are simple or complex, whether the policies' eff ects are opaque or easily observed, and so on. Scholars should assess the degree to which the relevant policy makers have the capacity to learn eff ectively from others' experiences and the political will to resist competitive or coercive pressures.
Although scholars would be remiss in ignoring the policy diff usion literature while examining their chosen policy areas, we wish to present not merely a cautionary tale but also a call to action. Perhaps better than anyone else, scholars of public administration are well positioned to advance the literature on policy diff usion in new and exciting directions. For example, almost all policy diff usion work to date focuses on the adoption stage of the public policy process (but see Karch 2007 and Pacheco and Boushey 2012 ). Yet public administration scholars know that the process does not end at adoption-rather, policies evolve through their implementation. Indeed, implementation may present some of the most important opportunities for learning and imitation over time and across governments. Extending the policy diff usion literature beyond initial policy adoptions is warranted and long overdue.
In a similar vein, nearly all policy diff usion studies explore legislative adoption by state or national governments, while ignoring the equally important decisions made by executive agencies. In one notable exception, Volden (2006) surprisingly fi nds evidence that state legislatures learned from other states' experiences much more than administrative critical. In contrast, the national government is the best location for "redistributive" policies, such as Social Security or Medicare, because states or localities could be overwhelmed by competitive pressures and thus might adopt insuffi cient social safety nets in these areas.
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Such arguments draw deeply on policy diff usion ideas. In short, when the positive learning aspects of policy diff usion outweigh the negative competitive aspects, policy making is improved by taking advantage of such learning opportunities through decentralization. If a policy shifts from redistributive to developmental (e.g., as with the change from welfare-only to welfare-to-work programs in the mid-1990s), devolution may be appropriate, with the possibility of learning about how to eff ectively encourage employment outweighing any remaining race-to-the-bottom concerns. As with all broad classifi cations, however, there are clearly exceptions, such as when competition around economic development has led states and localities to recruit businesses to their areas by using wasteful or ineff ectual subsidies and tax incentives (e.g., Enrich 1996) .
Decentralization can unleash the experimental power of policy diff usion, just as it can bring about healthy or unhealthy competition across governments. For example, in the fi rst fi ve years after the federal government granted control of new funds for children's health insurance to the states, state governments formally modifi ed their Children's Health Insurance Programs more than 100 times, learning from one another's experiences (Volden 2006) . In contrast, centralization can stifl e local policy experimentation. For instance, when state governments acted in the antismoking policy arena, local policy adoptions fell to about 70 percent of their former adoption rates (Shipan and Volden 2008) . Moreover, when the state government also included some preemptive language in its laws, local adoption rates fell by more than 90 percent.
Th e 2010 national health care reforms serve as an example of policy diff usion at work. Th e national model clearly built on some aspects of state policies, such as the individual health insurance mandate previously adopted in Massachusetts. Yet the adoption of national standards could cause state-level experimentation to be much more limited in the future. To attempt to address such limitations, the Patient Protection and Aff ordable Care Act includes provisions to try to recapture the benefi cial elements of state-level competition and experimentation, such as mandated health insurance exchanges required in each state. Whether these provisions allow adequate fl exibility and experiential learning to confront new and growing health care problems remains to be seen.
Centralization and decentralization decisions, like all major policy decisions, are made based on political considerations. Th ose who do not like the current policies at the state and local levels seek greater centralization during periods of favorable national political circumstances, while those who dislike the imposition of national policy given their local circumstances demand greater decentralization (e.g., McCann 2011). Although such preferences drive politics and, in turn, infl uence policy, fundamental principles of policy diff usion naturally factor into discussions about centralization and decentralization; however, they may not be weighed as heavily as they should be. Policy makers should be hesitant to centralize Policy makers should be hesitant to centralize control over complex and evolving policies that may be best solved over time through experimentation and learning. insuffi ciently acknowledged. Recognizing these processes for what they are may make policy makers' choices more transparent and more fully informed, potentially resulting in better public policies.
1. Th e nearby forests of policy diff usion research in economics and sociology off er many additional insights (e.g., Strang and Soule 1998) , some of which we incorporate here. Graham, Shipan, and Volden (forthcoming) explore potential connections in the policy diff usion literatures across the political science subfi elds of American politics, comparative politics, and international relations.
More broadly, policy diff usion is just one type of a larger class of "diff usion of innovation" studies explored across the years by Rogers (2003) . agencies did. Future work could build on existing studies of the extent to which legislators delegate policy control to administrative agencies in order to gain from their capacity to learn (e.g., Gilardi 2009; Huber and Shipan 2003) or in order to take advantage of agencies' lower likelihood of responding poorly to competitive or coercive forces. Such delegation decisions and subsequent policy choices could well be linked to the mechanisms of policy diff usion. Th erefore, scholars could more fully confront the question of whether policy delegation and policy diff usion are complements or substitutes. Once again, scholars of public administration are well suited to addressing these sorts of issues, given their knowledge of and insights into agency decision making.
As one fi nal academic example, too often the policies being considered in diff usion studies are dichotomized. Either a state has adopted a restriction on smoking in restaurants and bars or it has not. Yet public policy scholars know that policies are not mere binary choices. Some policies are more comprehensive than others. Some are coupled with limited enforcement. Many policies off er discretion to agencies or to other levels of government, while some restrict and preempt other policy makers. Studies of policy diff usion that consider these more nuanced policy elements may dramatically advance our understanding of which governments select which policies and why.
Th e lessons summarized here are not only of use to the scholarly community, but also of practical signifi cance. Many practitioners already are well aware of the pressures and considerations presented here. Th at said, they may not be as well attuned to how these different diff usion mechanisms relate to one another. Th ey may seek to learn from the experiences of other states; however, studies of policy diff usion have begun to point out that learning is just one of many potential mechanisms for diff usion. Th us, at times, it might make sense to push for a policy based on observing what other states have done, whereas at other times, learning might take a back seat to other potential mechanisms, such as economic competition. Th e literature on diff usion also illustrates for policy makers the ways in which decentralization and enhanced policy maker capacity can unleash the positive power of policy diff usion.
By no means do public administrators face these concerns and opportunities alone. At nearly every level of government around the world, policy makers fi nd themselves in networks of other likeminded leaders. Professional associations promote policy diff usion through best practice reports, webinars, and workshops. Th ey off er awards and rankings on such criteria as the "greenest city," the "healthiest state," or the "least corrupt nation." Yet a bit of caution is also advised, as policy choices alone deserve only part of the credit for these accolades, and policy makers must consider whether the recommendations are merely fads or ideas that may not be well suited to the government's most pressing problems. What works well in one area may not succeed elsewhere. And smaller governments in particular should be cautious about using their limited resources on policies that may not be eff ective upon being rescaled to suit a smaller community.
Most generally, then, our advice to practitioners is simply to observe the policy-making world through the lens of policy diff usion. Diff usion processes are everywhere, and they are often
